

—Open letter to Sen. Barry Goldwater—

Senator Barry Goldwater
Chairman, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Room G-303, Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Goldwater:

I ask your help in ending an improper U.S. intelligence agency domestic activity. The program is long term, and apparently its initial goal was to develop me as an intelligence agent. The program recently became unmanageable when I began to speak publicly about it. Now the agency's main concern seems to be to prevent further disclosure. This letter may be difficult to believe. I know, but the American intelligence community is well known for its unusual practices. To understand the program, you must know its background.

I. Programs of this kind are possible because of the mind set of their operators. Intelligence work is a ruthless profession. There are many good intelligence officers, but the good ones tend to be compartmentalized and excluded from questionable clandestine activities; in the long term the bad operators tend to move into positions of power.

These bad operators are often masochists and "true believers"—cold calculating men who believe that might makes right. In their eyes, lies, torture and death are trivial sacrifices in the service of a higher good.

Bad operators tend to be antidemocratic and interested mainly in power and control. B.F. Skinner's writings potently distill their view. The average man is a child who needs to be "led to happiness" according to Skinner. Society is best managed by experts. "We not only can control human behavior, we must," Skinner says, and control is the essence of the clandestine mentality.

II. The clandestine methods of the American intelligence community are "ugly, mean and cruel," according to the *New York Times*.

Preventing disclosure is the primary concern in any secret operation. In the intelligence community, strange and unusual practices which are easily deniable have become common. These practices include, for example, dispersing crowds with bomb threats and incapacitating a target with virulent live virus or tranquilizing drugs. (A target may be discredited by administration of a tranquilizing drug prior to an important interview. Giving drugs to unwilling subjects is a well-refined technique that is difficult to avoid. Identifying an unknown drug in the blood serum can be almost impossible.)

It is also standard operating procedure to bug a target's home, office and car; sift through his garbage; and, as time passes, to plant an amiable succession of informers in his path. This is routine. It is common as well to disrupt a target's marriage, his job, business contacts and friendships.

It's a hard game. A target, or even an operator who steps too far out of line may pay for the indiscretion with his life. Someone who because of publicity can't be eliminated through an "accident" or "suicide" may be "extracted" by deliberate induction of a slow acting terminal illness.

III. Communist penetration of the American intelligence service is an extremely sensitive issue; great effort is expended to prevent it. The counterintelligence measures used to prevent or expose penetration are of vital interest. When the exposure of one double agent could save lives and millions of dollars, the most trivial counterintelligence tool may be diligently sought and used. In order to deter Communist expansionism, and protect America, some sacrifices may seem justified.

The Clandestine Officer Development Program is one of the intelligence community's most secret and sensitive long-term projects. Its purpose is to select, surveil and "develop" young people for intelligence service. (Development involves actual intervention into the daily life of a subject.)

Training in this experimental program aims to develop loyalty, skills and a high tolerance for the pain and misery of an agent's life through manipulation and control of the trainee's environment. Part- and full-time government informers, acting as friends, may suggest books to read, provide suitable encouragement at key junctures in a subject's life and, it is hoped, "plant the seeds" of future political conviction. The program goes even deeper than this, though. Desirable friendships are encouraged while "unsuitable" relationships are undermined. If a broken family is the best climate for developing a high tolerance of pain and misery, this may be arranged.

IV. At least fifteen years ago, the agency began a three phase, long term agent-development program with me as the target. The program initially focused on basic agent development with only a modest investment in time and money. When I graduated from college in 1976, a second phase began—I was offered a job in intelligence service. I carefully researched the agency for over six months and then declined. My friends turned cold, and a process of clandestine coercion began. "We'll pester you until you join."

This "encouragement" crescendited after five years when I was told my family or myself could be "hurt or killed" if I didn't cooperate. Why force in a new recruit? The recruit as a person is not important; his training is all that counts. The practice of "forcing" in new recruits is uncommon. However, Victor Marchetti, former CIA executive assistant to the Deputy Director, said in a television interview that American citizens are at times forced into government service using clandestine methods of coercion. Marchetti concluded: "It usually doesn't work out too good."

The agency prefers to select officer candidates from the population at large, especially recent college graduates. The agency knows that misfits are attracted to the agency and tries to avoid this problem. Ideally, the agency recruits honest people

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I. Programs of this kind are possible because of the mind set of their operators. Intelligence work is a ruthless profession. There are many good intelligence officers, but the good ones tend to be compartmentalized and excluded from espionage clandestine activities. In the long term the bad operators tend to move into positions of power.

These bad operators are often manipulative and "true believers"—cold calculating men who believe that might makes right. In their eyes, lies, torture and death are trivial sacrifices in the service of a higher good.

Bad operators tend to be antidemocratic and interested mainly in power and control. B. F. Skinner, a noted psychologist, has written: "The average person is a 'weak animal' led to happiness," according to Skinner. Society is best managed by experts. "We not only can control human behavior, we must," Skinner says, and control is the absence of the clandestine mentality.

II. The clandestine methods of the American intelligence community are "ugly, mean and cruel," according to the *New York Times*.

Preventing disclosure is the primary concern in any secret operation. In the intelligence community, strange and unusual practices which are easily deniable have been used to keep secret operations from disclosure. These practices include: (1) "black bagging" (kidnapping a target and torturing him); (2) "black bugging" (bomb threats and threatening a target with incendiary bombs or tranquilizing drugs); (3) "blackmail" (discredited by administration of a tranquilizing drug prior to an important interview. Giving drugs to unwilling subjects is a well-refined technique that is difficult to avoid; identifying an unknown drug in the blood serum can be almost impossible.)

It is also standard operating procedure to bug a target's home, office and car, sift through his garbage and, as time passes, plan an amiable succession of informers in his family, his business, his community as well to disrupt a target's marriage, his job, business contacts and friendships.

It is a hard game. A target or even an operator who stays too far out of line may pay for the expectation with his life. Someone who because of publicity can't be eliminated through an "accident" or "homicide" may be "extracted" by deliberate inducement of a slow acting terminal illness.

III. Communist penetration of the American intelligence service is an extremely sensitive issue. Great effort is expended to prevent it. The counterintelligence measures used to prevent or expose penetration are of vital interest. When the exposure of a penetration is discovered, the agency's counterintelligence and counterintelligence too may be brutally sought and used. In order to cover Communists, some sacrifices may seem justified.

The Clandestine Officer Development Program is one of the intelligence community's most secret and sensitive long-term projects. Its purpose is to select, screen and "develop" young people for intelligence service. (Development involves actual intervention into the daily life of a subject.)

Training in this experimental program aims to develop loyalty, guts and a high tolerance for pain and misery. The agency's approach may be described as that of the trainer's environment. Pen and sub-lime government informers, acting as friends, may suggest books to read, provide suitable encouragement at key junctures in a subject's life and it is hoped "plant the seeds" of future political conviction. The program goes even deeper than this. Through "desirable friendships" are encouraged while "undesirable" relationships are undermined. If a broad family is the best climate for developing a high tolerance of pain and misery, this may be arranged.

IV. At least fifteen years ago the agency began a three phase, long term agent development program with me as the target. The program initially focused on basic agent development with only a modest income, money and time. When I graduated from college in 1976 a second phase began—I was offered a job in intelligence service. I carefully researched the agency for over six months and then declined. My friends turned cold and a process of clandestine coercion began: "We'll pester you until you join."

This encouragement crescendos after five years when I was told my family or myself could be "hurt or killed" if I didn't cooperate. Why force it a new recruit? The recruit as a person is not important; his training is of much more. The practice of torture and manipulation with me as the target. The program initially focused on basic agent development with only a modest income, money and time. When I graduated from college in 1976 a second phase began—I was offered a job in intelligence service. I carefully researched the agency for over six months and then declined. My friends turned cold and a process of clandestine coercion began: "We'll pester you until you join."

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The agency pretends to seek officer candidates from the population at large—especially recent college graduates. The agency knows that most of us are attracted to the agency and tries to avoid this problem. Ideally, the agency recruits honest people who are carefully introduced to clandestine methods in basic training at "the farm." The initially street-wise are considered poor security risks. They may cheat the system.

Some candidates for sensitive jobs go through many years of pre-employment surveillance. The agency doesn't like to take "no" for an answer from these "oddities" individuals.

Exasperated, I finally spoke personally to my U.S. Congressman, sought legal advice and published a description of my experience naming some of those responsible. After this, the third and current phase of the operation began—the agency's secret war.

I was in the grade of A- on a full course load. During my last year of post-graduate study at UCSD, I took it out about agency impropriety during the summer break though, and the following fall was forced out of the university through an intense program of clandestine coercion.

The operation started small and grew larger in its final stages. Initially modest "training" outlays became a substantial investment when I was finally targeted as a security risk. "He knew too much and he started to talk." Like a poker game, the stakes grew larger and larger until the agency's chips could roll before the exposure. The agency's chips were my life.

The operation is a gross violation of my constitutional rights and gives substantial grounds for both a criminal complaint and a civil lawsuit. A court victory could lead to the punishment of those directly responsible as well as jeopardizing legal agent-development operations and significantly damaging the agency's reputation.

The agency seems to want to put on an operation which has escalated out of all proportion. It presently is aiming to invalidate information and names which I have already revealed and to prevent further disclosure. For now, this probably means keeping me in a position of public disrepute but a long-term solution may be to permanently destroy my credibility to keep me down, to make me appear off-balance, or perhaps as promised to frame and jail, or even assassinate.

I have four choices:

1) I can fight back. This means lobbying for a Congressional Committee Inquiry, filing a lawsuit and also engaging in regular public discussion which will diminish the chance of severe reprisal (low-key reprisal is almost certain). A civil suit will cost approximately \$40,000 and may last two to four years to conclude.

2) I may continue my education in a country where the U.S. intelligence bureaucracy cannot act freely. I love my country; this would be a hard choice.

3) I may run and hide.

4) I may do what I am told. This would only tighten the noose around the necks of others who are in a similar position.

V. I am not interested in making a vindictive attack on the intelligence bureaucracy. If the agency is forced to acknowledge the program's existence, however, the agency will end. I will compromise and not press for legal sanctions (if appropriate I will sign a waiver) if the agency will simply acknowledge its activities, apologize and stop.

What is the agency? From the age of twenty, only one agency was ever discussed with me—the Central Intelligence Agency. Senator Cranston and Representative Lagomarsino both said the CIA's director if the CIA was responsible. CIA legislative council Frederick P. Kutz responded that "relevant agency records were examined and no information whatsoever concerning [me] was found." Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick, former executive director of the CIA, has a reputation for honesty that is rare in the intelligence community. He is a person I can trust but the CIA did not answer me.

A Santa Barbara source with intelligence liaison connections says that (1) The intelligence community is a team. Accountability can be avoided by shifting records from one agency to another. (2) Recruitment and preliminary employment discussions often are conducted under "cover" of a different agency.

The agency responsible for the operation has identified itself as the CIA, but this may be false. If the parent agency is not the CIA then what is it? I can only speculate, but it seems almost certain that the Intelligence Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation knows of the operation's existence. I respectfully request that you forward this letter to the assistant director in charge of the Intelligence Division at the FBI (4026JER) and ask him to confirm or deny the activities I describe.

I am publishing this as an "open letter" in the Santa Barbara News and Review. I will forward your response to the News and Review and also to the Santa Barbara News Press.

Thank you very much.

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